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PBSTRACT
The substantial post war decline in the U.S. saving rate has added
greatimpetus to the debate over whether public debt policy crowds out saving.
Rather than attempting to reject specific saving models, empirical research
on debt policy and savings has primarily focused on the impact of particular
policy variables on savings. In this paper we examine Barro's infinite horizon,
intergenerationally altruistic model. A distinguishing feature of this model
is that aggregate consumption depends only on collective resources and not the
age distribution of resources.
To test this proposition we specify the Barro model under earnings
uncertainty, rate of return uncertainty, and demographic change and test
whether, given the level of consumption predicted by this model, variables
measuring the age distribution of resources influence actual consumption. Data
on the age distribution of resources are primarily obtained from the annual
Current Population Surveys. Our results imply a rejection of the hypothesis
that aggregate consumption is independent of the age distribution of resources.
They therefore cast doubt on the contention that government debt policy does not
affectconsumption and saving.
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The significant postwar decline in the U.S. saving rate is a rather
startling stylized fact that invites explanation. Since 1930 the U.S. has been
saving 14.7 percent of its net national product. This figure contrasts with the
7.8 percent average saving rate of the l9TOs, the 8.7 percent average rate of
the 1960s, and the 8.8 percent average rate of the l950s.- The U.S. saving
rate is quite low not only relative to its own recent past level, but also
relative to the saving rates of its principal trading partners. Since 1960 the
U.S. net national saving rate has averaged only 55 percent of the European OECD
rate and just 314 percent of the Japanese rate.2 Over the postwar period the U.S.
econoIr has experienced remarkable changes in fertility rates, the median age of
retirement, and the rate of female labor forceparticipation;but each of these
changes appears more likely to have raised rather than lowered the rate of
saving.
The search for a culprit in explaining the saving reduction has led
naturallyto the federal government'sdoorstep. This paper examines the
government's potential role in influencing postwar U.S. saving. As argued in
thenext section, a "smoking gun" inthis mystery,if oneis to be found, is
mostlikely hiding amidst the government's intergenerational transfer policies.
Intergenerational transfer policies are referred to here as debt policies; they
may be explicit, in the sense of altering the government's official measure of
its liabilities, or implicit, in which case cross generational transfers arise,
but have no direct impact on accounting deficits.—2—
Fesolving the impact of debt policy on saving is no easy task. There
are only a few, rather subtle testable differences between, for example, the
life cycle model (Modigliani and Brurnberg (l95)) that predicts crowding out
from debt policies and the infinite horizon Barro (l9T) model that predicts no
crowding out. Section II contains a short discussion of this point and a
description of tests that can potentially discriminate between these models.
The main contribution of this paper is to examine empirically Barro's model of
intergenerational altruism. A restatement of the proposition that intergenera-
tionaltransfers do not influence saving is that saving is invariant to the age
distribution of resources.3 This proposition is directly tested by measuring
the excess influence of the age distribution of personal income and components
of personal income on aggregate consumption given the level of consumption
predictedby our formulation of the Barro model.
This model, which is described in section III, differs from that
underlying the traditional time series consumption regression (e.g., Feldstein
(l971), Barro (19T8), Munnell (l9Tlii, Darby (l9T9)) by explicitly incorporating
earningsuncertainty, rate of return uncertainty, and demographic change into
the optimal consumption decision. From the perspective ofuncertaintymodels,
thestandard consumption specification seems quite naive; indeed, the failure
explicitly to model uncertainty produces major conundrums over squeezing data
from an uncertain world into a certainty model (Leinier and Lesnoy (1981)). Our
approach to including uncertainty in the analysis involves estimating simple
stochastic processes for earnings and the return to savings and explicitly
solving for the optimal consumption path of the infinitely lived Barro—type—3—
family. Wethen test whether, given the optimal predicted consumption program,
the age distribution of resources has an impact on actual aggregate consumption.
Since the age distribution of resources is obviously influenced br changes in
the population age structure, the model controls for such changes by taking
explicit account of variations in the size and age distribution of the
population.
Section IV contains a description of the data and the specification of
earnings and return uncertainty. The empirical findings are discussed in
section V, and concluding comments appear in Section VI.
I. Government Fiscal Policy and National Saving
In considering the government's potential impact on saving one might
ask whether postwar growth in total (federal, state, and local) government
consumptionrelative to NNPcould be a key factor. The ratio of government
consumptiontoNNP has increased, but the increase has been fairly modest.
Government consumption averaged 21.14 percent of net national product in the
1950s, 23.0 percent in the 1960s, 23.5 percent in the 1970s, and 23.1 percent
in the period l980_19814. If, during the last 5years, government consumption
had been 21.14percent rather than 23.1 percent of NNP and if private consumption
asa share of NNPhadnot changed, the net national saving rate wouldhave
averaged6.5 percent rather than 14.7 percent. Assuming that private consumption
is invariant to changes in government consumption seems, however, highly
unrealistic. At one extreme, government consumption ny substitute perfectly
for private consumption (Bailey (1961) and David and Scadding (19714)). In this—
casethe 1.1 percentage point increase in the ratio of government consumption to
NNP between the 50s and early BOs would, abstracting from issues of tax
distortions and redistributions, have been completely offset by a 1.7 percentage
point decrease in the ratio of private consumption to NNP, leaving the net
national saving rate unchanged. With government consumption a perfect
substitute for private consumption, the private sector's ultimate disposable
income is simply NNP; and the private saving rate would coincide with the net
national saving rate. From this perspective, the key question is why the
private sector's saving behavior changed such that total consumption, private
plus government, rose as a share of NNP.
At the other extreme, government consumption might not enter private
utility functions at all, or might enter separably. In choosing its consumption
level one would expect the private sector in this case to view NNP—G, where G is
government consumption, as its ultimate disposable income, since current
governmentconsumption must ultimately be financed by the private sector)
Inthel950stheprivate sector saved 10.9 percent of this definition of
disposableincome. In the 1980s the corresponding saving rate has been only
6.1 percent. Had the private sector maintained its 1950's 10.9 percent rate of
saving out of NNP—G,therise in the ratio of government's consumption to NNP
wouldhave generated only a L5percentdecline in the net national saving rate
between the 1950s and 1980s, rather than the I6.6percentdrop actually
observed. From this perspective the increase in the government's rate of con-
sumptionout of N1Pcontributed, at mast, a small amount to the decline in the
netnational saving rate. Again, the real question is why anappropriately
definedprivate saving rate fell during this period.—5--
Asecond accusation that could be levelled at government policy is
that the use of distortionary taxes to finance both its consumption and transfer
expenditures has reduced incentives to work and save. While there was some
increase in average marginal taxes on labor earnings, the increase was modest
and seems unlikely to account for the decline in the U.S. saving rate. A recent
article by Barro and Sahasakul (1983) suggests that the average marginal tax on
labor income was 22 per cent in the 1950s, 22 percent in the 1960s, and 27
percent in the 1970s.5
These marginal tax figures exclude social security's payroll tax.
However, there is reason to believe that inclusion of Social Security's tax and
benefit provisions in the analysis would reduce rather than raise estimated
marginal labor taxes particularly in the 1970s. Blinder and Gordon's (1981)
analysis suggests that social security's tax and benefit provisions constitute a
sizeable subsidy to labor earnings of married males and others leaving net
effective marginal taxes on labor earnings for these groups quite low. Boskin
and Hurd (198k) confirm the significant size of the Gordon effect. Crediting
the public with the perspicacity and knowledge required to assess correctly the
marginal social security return on the marginal tax contribution may be
unrealistic; but the opposite assumption, that workers believe they receive no
return at the margin for marginal social security tax payments, seems equally
implausible. If one takes an intermediate view that workers view marginal
social security taxes as providing marginal social security benefits of equal
present value, then the post 1950 rise in the average marginal tax on labor
income is adequately captured by Barro and Sahasakul's estimates.—6—
Marginal saving incentives arealso determined by capital income
taxes.Severalstudies argue that effective capital income taxes, at least on
corporate source income, rose substantially in the 1970s (e.g., Feldstein and
Summers (1919)). But in contrast to this popular belief that such taxes rose
between 1950 and 1980, extensive calculations contained in King and Fullerton
(l98) suggest a small decline in effective marginal taxes on capital income
over this period. The 1981 tax act lowered effective marginal capital income
taxes more significantly. Based on a ten percent pretax return to capital and
theprevailing inflation rate King and Fullerton calculate that the overall
effectivemarginal capital income taxratewasI8 percentin 1960, 37percent in
1980,26 percentin 1981, and 32 percent in 1982. In combination with the
figures just cited for marginal taxes on labor income, these findings suggest
thatthe distortive effects of government fiscal policy cannot explain the drop
in the U.S. saving rate over the last 35years.
Another type of policy that couldpotentially beblamed for the saving
declineisintragenerational redistribution from the rich to the poor. The poor
may have a higher rate of time preference than the rich. Alternatively the poor
may be liquidity constrained. In either case the poor within arr age group will
havelarger marginal propensities toconsume than their better endowed
contemporaries;and intragenerational transfersfrom the rich to the poor will
lowersaving. Emily Lawrence (1983) recently examined the potential effect of
intragenerational redistribution on saving using a life cycle simulation model.
Lawrence considered verj substantial differences in time preference rates between
the rich and poor as well as liquidity constrained consuription by the poor. She—7—
found that even very significant intragenerational redistribution, such as that
characterizing U.S. welfare programs, has only minor effects on saving in life
cycle models.
The explanation for these small changes in the case of differences in
time preference rates is simply that neither the associated differences in
marginalconsumption propensities across the two groups nor the size of the
simulated transfers are sufficiently large to have much impact on the econorrrj's
total wealth accumulation. In the case the poor are liquidity constrained,
theirmarginal consumption propensities are unity; but the change in disposable
income multiplying their unitary propensities is only current transfers. For
rich,unconstrained transferers, the reduction in current consumption equals
their much smaller marginal propensity to consume multiplied by the present
value of transfers, which is typically a much larger number than simply the
current payment. The reduced consumption of the rich offsets to a significant
extent the increased consumption of the liquidity constrainedpoor producing
onlya small reduction in national saving despite a quite substantial program of
intragenerationaltransfers.We conclude from this andrelated dels that
intrageneratiorial redistribution is probably not a major determinant of the
decline in the U.S. saving rate since 1950.
A fourth channel by which government policy may have reduced saving is
by transfering resources from youngerand futuregenerationsto older genera-
tions. Intergenerationaltransfers towards older generations, which isreferred
to here as debt policy, can be and have been conducted in quite subtle ways.
The unfunded financing of the U.S. Social Security System is by now a well—8—
understood,ifnonethelessquite subtle, debt policy (Feldstein (l971)). Less
wellunde rstood debt policies are changes in the tax stracture that shift the
burden of taxation fromolder to younger age groups(Summers (1981a), Auerbach
andKotlikoff (1983a)) and changes in tax provisions that raise market values of
financial assets and, thereby, transfer resources to older age groups who are
thepriinaiy owners of such assets (F'eldstein (1977), Summers(198Th)).An
exampleof the former type of policy is switching fromincometaxation to wage
taxation. An example of the latter policy is reducing investment incentives
(Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983b)). Since investment incentives in the U.S. are
effectively provided only to new investment, old capital, capital that has been
fully or partially written off, sells at a discount reflecting the differential
tax treatment. A reduction in investment incentives means a smaller discount
and a capital gain to owners of old capital. Younger and future generations are
worse off as a result of such policies because they rrn.ist now pay a higher price
to acquireclaims to the econoiry's capital stock.
Inaddition to these ire subtle mechanisms oftransferring to older
generations, governments can engage in debt policies by reducing taxes levied on
current generations and raising taxeslevied onfuture generations.
Intergenerationalredistribution of this variety mayeventuatein larger offi-
ciallyreported deficits.An example in which even this ire obvious fonn of
redistributiondoes not necessarily alter official debt calculations is when
such tax cuts and tax increases are coincident, respectively, with equivalent
reductions and increases in the level of government consumption.
The fact that very significant intergenerational redistribution can be
runwithoutits ever showing up on government books suggests that officially—9—
reporteddeficits are at best a verj poor indicator of underlying economic debt
policies.6 This proposition notwithstanding, there has been an enormous public
interest, especially in recent years, in officially reported deficits.
Curiously, public attention has focused only on a subset of official liabili-
ties of the federal government and has essentially ignored both the official
assets of the federal government as well as the official assets and liabilities
of state and local governments. As discussed by Boskin (1982, 1985),Eisner
and Pieper (l981), and the 1982 Economic Report of the President, the n.rket
value of the U.S. federal governmentts official assets maycurrentlyequal if
not exceed the market value of its official liabilities.
Inlightof the verysignificantifnotoverwhelming difficulties of
gaugingthe extent of true debt policies from official reports, it seems safer
toassess post war U.S.debt policy byaskingthe following question: were the
lifetimebudget constraints of older generations expanded significantly in the
post war period as a consequence of government policy at the. expense of
contractedbudget constraints for young and future generations? One might
point, in this context, to the enormous expansion of the social security system
which greatly increased the budget opportunities of the elderly. The problem,
however, with considering any one component of government policy is that it may
havebeen instituted to offset some other component; i.e., the postwar redistri-
bution through social security to the elderly y simply represent the
government's way of compensating the elderly for higher income taxes over their
lifetimes or for their contribution to the nation during World War II. Just as
there is no single correct wayto measure offical deficits, there is no single—10—
correct way of posing counterfactuals about observed government transferpoli-
cies. To put this point differently, intergenerational redistribution must
alwaysbeassessed relative to some benchmark, and the choice of a benchmark
seems inherently subjective. The implication of this point is that any calcula-
tion of the magnitude of postwarintergenerationaltransfers will be arbitrary.7
Having conceded this point we believe that at least one interesting,
if arbitrary, counterfactual to pose with respect to postwar U.S. debt policy is
an econoir with either a very small unfunded social security program targeted
toward the elderly poor or a larger, butfullyfunded social security system.
Thereis little need to review here the well—known facts about the magnitude of
the U.S. Social Security system 'whose unfunded liabilities appear to range
between4 and 6 times the size of the U.S. government's official liabilities.8
The growth of this program was coincident with the decline in the net national
saving rate. The social security system appears to represent the only
(potentially) discrete postwar intergenerational transfer policy capable of pro-
ducing a major drop in the national saving rate. Simulation studies of the
potential savings impact of unfunded Social Security suggest a possible reduc-
tionin long—run savings of20 to 25 percent (Kotlikoff (1979) and Auerbach and
Kotlikoff(1983c)).
Tosummarizethis section, wehaveidentifiedfourstylized features
offiscal policy, viz., government consumption, the extent of distortionary
taxation, intragenerational transfers, and intergenerational transfers, each of
which canaffecta nationts saving behavior. We havetriedto argue,although
hardly exhaustively, that of these four features of fiscal policy, intergenera——11-.
tionaltransfers arethemost likely to have generated a decline in the U.S.
saving rate over the last three and a half decades.
We turn next to a brief discussion of recent empirical attempts to
resolve the impact of debt policies on saving. In the course of reviewing this
literature we indicate that there have been surprisingly few tests designed to
distinguish sharply amongbroad modelsof saving. Rather than testing more
fundamental propositions of particular saving models, st of the research has
concentrated on the empirical impact of particular policy variables on consuiup—
tion and savings. This focus has been excessive; indeed, in trany studies the
predicted impact of policy variables on dependent variables is the same under
models with quite different implications about the affect of debt policies on
national saving.
II. Empirical Analyses of Debt Policies
Much of the recent empirical research relating to the effects of eco—
nornic deficits falls into two categories: cross—sectional analysis of social
security'simpact onhousehold wealth accumulation andtime series analysis
of the consumption impact of government policy variables, such as social
security wealth. Many cross—sectional studies have proceeded without clealy
formulating rejectable hypotheses concerning Barro's (197)4) conjecture of
intergenerational altruism. These studies, including those of Feldstein and
Pellechio (1979) and Kotlikoff (1979b), involve regressions of household private
wealth on social security tax and transfer variables. The central question
posed in niuch of this literature is whether households reduce their private— 12—
asset accumulation when young because of the anticipation of receiving net wind-.
fall transfers when old. The evidence here is mixed, but even if each of these
studies had strongly confirmed the proposition that expected future windfalls
lead to higher current consumption arid, therefore, less private wealth accumula-
tion, the results would still leave unresolved the issue of altruism; the
altruistic hypothesis, like the life cycle hypothesis, suggests that increases
in the future resources of a particular household should raise that household's
consumption and lower its own savings. In the altruistic case, however, the
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allother altruistically linked households in the extended family. Indeed, a
central proposition of the altruism hypothesis is that the consumption of par-
ticular extended family members depends on the resources of other extended
family members. Unfortunately, this latter proposition is not tested in the
cross—section empirical literature, nor does it appear capable of being tested,
at least for the U.S., given available micro data sources (although Kurz (1982)
indirectly examines altruistic behavior using data on transfers.)
While this distinguishing implication of the altruism del has not
been tested, a distinguishing implication of the pure life cycle uodel, that the
elderly have larger marginal consumption propensities, has been directly tested
by Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1981). Their findings are weakly supportive of
this proposition. Other implications of the life cycle idel have also been
analyzed. For example, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) find that life cycle saving
cannot explain the bulk of U.S. savings. Several studies addressing dissaving
after retirement by Darby (1978), Mirer (1979), David and Menchik (1980), and—13—
Bernheim (198i) find either no dissaving or too little to be consistent with the
strictlife cycle model.
The time series analyses of Feldstein (l9'fl, 1982), Munnell (l971),
Barro (1918), Darby (1919), Leimer and Lesnoy (1981), and numerous others have
proved inconclusive. The econometrics here is plagued by problems of
aggregation,simultaneity, and errors in defining variables such as social
security wealth. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983c) demonstrate the problem of the
timeseries statistical approach by running the standard time series
specification on simulated data that conformed perfectly to the nonaltruistic,
life cycle hypothesis. The coefficients on the critical social security wealth
variable as well as many other variables proved extraordinarily sensitive to the
choice of sample period. Auerbach andKotlikoffconcluded that the standard
time series approach could easilyrejectthe strict life cycle, no altruism
hypothesiseven if it weretrue.
Curiously,the time series studies have been quite vague with respect
to which of several (e.g., life cycle, Keynesian, or altruistic) saving models
isbeing tested. As a consequence a variety of ad hoc specifications have
been employed. In a time series context taking the life cycle model as the null
hypothesis immediately runs afoul of the paucity of cohort specific time series
data. Absent such data keyparameterscannot be identified and one cannot test
two basic propositions of the life cycle models alluded to above: First, that
consumption of a particular cohort depends onlyon its own resources and not
collectivesocietalresources; and second, that older cohorts have larger rrargi—
nal consumption propensities.The Barro idel is much more suited to analysis with time series data
since only collective, rather than cohort specific resources are predicted to
influence aggregate consumption. This proposition is particularlyusefulin
incorporating government policy in the model. In a certainty model the private
Barro economy's budget can be written as the economy's total human plus non-
human resources(including those owned bythe government) less the present
valueofgovernment consumption. As described below an analogous private budget
constraint,involving only government consumption, i.e.,requiring no infor-
mation abouttaxes, arises witri uncertainty.
As mentioned, the key proposition of the Barro ndel that consumption
depends on collective resources and does not depend on the age distribution of
resources is the focus of our empirical work. To test this proposition, we spe-
cifythe Barro nde1 under earnings and rate of return uncertainty and determine
whether,given the consumption predicted by this nodel, variables measuring
the age distribution of resources significantly influence actual consumption.
Data obtained from annual current population surveys on the age distribution of
income, including wages and salaries, property income, and government transfer
payments, are used for this test. In addition, we use data compiled by Dean
Leirner and Selig Lesnoy (1981) on the distribution of net Social Security wealth
by age.
III.TheBarro Model with Demographics and Uncertain Earnings and Returns
Theexpected utility of the "infinite horizon" Barro family at time t,
U, is written in equation (i).—15—
D
(i) U=E L e u(c
tt t+T,aat+T,a t=O a=O
The function u( )whenmultiplied by 0a indicates the family's period
t+tutilityassociated with the consumption of a member age a at t+r,
a
Inthis formulation of the utility from particular family members' consumption,
the 0a parameters can be thought of as age—specific utility weights. They
determine the relative consumption of different family members at a point in
time; i.e., they determine the shape of the cross secion age—consumption
profile.t+T,a is the number of family members agea (with maximum longevity of
D)at time t+T, and c is a discount factor. Since we areapplyingthis model to
the entire U.S. economy, t+Ta correspondstothe U.S. population age a at
t+T.Thefunction TJ()isassumed to be of the iso—elastic form, i.e.:
l—y
(2) u(c)
LetA stand for the private sector's net worth at time t, Gt for
government consumption at time t,for the stochastic pre-tax returnto savings
receivedat the endofperiod t,for the stochastic pre—tax labor earnings
of the economy received at the end of period t, andfor net taxes paid by
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In(14) is the nrginal effective capital income tax, which is assumed here
to be nonstochastic.
At any point in time the relationship between consumption of different
age groups is given by:
c e1/i
t,a _a _______— 'a
t,a+l a+l
Turning to the government's budget constraint, let and Gt stand,
respectively, for government net worth and consumption at time t, then





Adding(6) to (3) gives the following expression for the evolution








In this model the distribution of tax burdens either at a point in
time or over time has no impact on consumption choice; hence government policy
is fully described by the evolution of Gt and the marginal effective capital
income tax, Given the time paths of these policy variables as well as
earnings and return distributions, equations (14), (5), and (7) can be used in—iT —
solvingfor the optimal choice of consumption at any point in time. In contrast
to other analyses such as Feidstein (l9T)-) and Barro (19T8), this formulation
avoids the difficulties of defining and measuring government debt policy
variables such as Social Security wealth.
In this one good model all net worth terms,A,A, and At. are
measuredat replacement cost rather than market value. This method of
expressing the private and government budget constraints plus the fact that
r is the pre—tax rate of return implies that Tt includes taxeslevied both on
householdsand on businesses. To illustrate the point consider an econorrrj with
a single tax levied on the profits of businesses at rate p.Alsoassume the
government permits full expensing of new investment. For simplicity assume pri-
vate assets consist only of holdings of capital, Kt, end official government
debt, Dt. As described in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983b) the market value of
private capital is (l_1i)K, where K is the replacement value of capital at t.
Since the return on capital paid by- business with full expensing is the pre—tax





















corresponds to expensing rebates obtained from the
government, andi.irtK
corresponds to business profits taxes. The corresponding—18—
government equation is:
(9) =+ c)(1+ — + .(K1—K)
Subtracting (9) from(8')yields (T).
Thethree equations (14), (5), and (7) that are used to solve for the
optimal consumption program can be furthersimplifiedby using (5) to express
(14) and (7) in terms of the consumption of a Barro family member age a*.







Solving for the Optimal Consumption Program
Our method of deterrriing the optimal consumption plan is to solve
the finite period analogue to the infinite horizon ndel for a time horizon
sufficiently large that extending it would make no difference to our results.
Specifically we solve the finite period model for successively larger values of
t,wheretisthe number of periods, until the consumption programs for each of
thefirst50periods converge. Our data covers 19146 through 19814; we choose
2060 as the terminal year. The optimal consumption values for the years 19146 to
19814 based on a terminal year of2059were less than a half percent different
from those derived using 2060 as the terminal year.
The finite period problem is solved using dynamic programming. At
time t+ttheconsuinrtion function Ct+a* is given by:—19—
(10) Ct+a*(At+t) =At+
—Gt+
Substituting this expression Into the Euler relationship (4') for period t+'r—l
yields:
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From(11')and the implicit function theorem we have that is a rnotonic
increasing function of A —,i.e.:
t+t—l
(12) Ct+_ia* =ct+_ia*(At+_i;
In(12) S.-1 is a vector of state variables conditioning the distributions
of —and e —.Thefunction C —() can now be used to solve for t+t—1 t+t—1 t4-T—1
Ct+_2(At+_2; Proceeding in this manner one can calculate each
consumption function C+(At+ ; S÷) for 0 ( (t—3.
In general there are no simple closed form solutions for the
C+( ) functions, andthesefunctions must be derived numerically. The
numericalmethod we employis to select a grid of potential values of
Aand S •Nextwetakerandom drawsfromthe bivariate distribution t+t t+t—20—
f and conditional on the particular grid value of S4. These
draws are then used to evaluate (conditional on alternative values of
the expectation of c++1( )1(+rt+T(1_t+T)) for alternative values
of •Thevalue of C÷* producing an equality between this
expectation and Ct+Ta*1 i::., satisring (n'),isstored as
the function Ct+Ta*(At+TSt+T)• The number of grid points and random draws
chosen are sufficiently large that our empirical result are invariant to further
increases in their values.
IV. Specification of Return and Earnings Uncertainty and Description of the Data
The model outlined in section III assumes that current and future
population age distributions areknown withcertainty. To be consistent in
modeling earnings uncertainty, we also assume that Barrofamilyplanners
understandthe impact of projected demographic change on future total labor
earnings distributions. More generally, we assume thattheage distribution
of earnings is knownwithcertainty. What is uncertain then is the level
of earnings at future dates for a representative worker. Let w+1*bethe
randomannual earnings of the benchmark worker age a*at time t+r.Then





is the non—stochastic ratio of earnings of a worker age a at t+t
to that of a worker age a* at t+t, and is the non—stochastic work
experience rate for the population age a at t+T.—21—
We assume the following fairly simplebivariate process





+c1 log Wt+t_l,a* ÷ 2t+Tl + C
r+T c3 + c14r÷T 1 + c5log Wt+.r_l,a* + Cr
where C and C are mean zero, bivariately distributed normal errors with W2 r2
variances a ,a,andcovariance a .Sincethe distributions of w and C r Cr t+T,a*
depend on their lagged values, these lagged variables represent the additional
state variables entering the Ct+ta*( )functions.9
Valuesof w÷Ta*are calculatedfor the years 19146 through 19814by
dividing total annual earnings by the multiplicand of in (13). Total
annual earnings equals NIA wageandsalary compensation plus an updated version
of Kotlikoff and Summers' (1981) estimate of labor earnings of the self employed.
Values for the relative earnings profile come from Social Security data
on median earnings by age and sex.1° There is very little variation in this
profile between 19146 and 19814. For years after 19814 the projected profile of
relative earnings is set equal to the 19814 relative earnings profile. Work
experiencerates by age and sex are reported starting in 1959 in the Employment
andTraining Reportof the President, although labor force participation rates
are available for the entire periodJ3- For the period 19146 through 1958 work
experience ratesareimputed based on a regression of work experience rates on labor
force participation ratesforthe years 1959 through 19814. Work experience
ratesprojected beyond 19814 are assumed to equal the 19814 rates.—22—
Private consumption is measured here as NIA consumer expenditures on
non—durables and serrices plus imputed rent on durables. The BEA consumer
durables series was used in this calculation. The rate of imputation equals the
annual average three month Treasury bill rate less the annual percentage
increase in the POE durables deflator plus an assumed 20 percent depreciation
rate. Government consumption is also corrected for durables consumption. The
stock of government durables, both military and nonmilitary, was divided into
equipment and structures. A 20 percent rate of depreciation was assumed for
government equipment, and a 3percentdepreciation rate was assumed for
government structures. Like demographics andtheagedistributionof earnings,
weassume that the future course of government consumption is known with
certainty. Future government consumption is determined by assuming that
government consumption per capita after 19814 equals the 19814 level of government
consumption per capita. Besides government consumption, the marginal tax on
capital income is the only policy variable influencing the optimal consumption
plan. A 30 percent marginal tax on capital income is used in calculating each
of the consumption functions for the years 19146 through 2060.
Econo,r wide net worth is measured as the sum of private plus govern-
ment reproducible tangible wealth nasured at replacement cost estimated by the
BEA, plus the value of private land estimated by the Federal Reserve. These and
other series are deflated to 19T2 dollars. Given wealth in years t and t+l, and
year t earnings, private consumption, and government consumption, equation (7)
canbe used to solve for r+T. This procedure was used to determine the pretax
rateof return series for the period 19146through 19814.—23—
Data for the age distribution of resources, which, according to the
Barro model, is irrelevant for aggregate consumption, was obtained from the
annual Current Population Surveys (CPS) for the years1968throughl984.
While the CPSdatadoes not provide information about asset holdings, it does
include property income, wage and salary income, and government transfers
including welfare, food stamps, unemployment compensation, veterans' benefits,
and Social Security retirement and disability benefits. These data and the CPS
population weights are used to construct shares of total income as well as
shares of labor income, property income, and social security income of
households with heads whose ages fafl in particular age categories.
V. Testing the Intergenerational Altruism Model
Equation (15) indicates the nonlinear regression rdel used to test
intergenerational alt ruism.
(15) Ct = +
W 1,r l;OO,...,OD,1,P) + Xisi + •••
+Xs + 6ct
In (is)Cis actual consumption, Ct( )isthe level of total consumption
predicted by our idel and depends on the age—utility weights e,...,OD, the
relative risk aversion coefficient y, and the time preference rate p, where p =
Thevariables s1 through s are year t shares of personal income or components of
personal income of in different agegroups.The error is assumed to be
normallydistribited with mean zero and variancea2.A test of the altruism
model,conditional, of course, on both our specificationof intergenerational
altruismand our functional formsfor utility as well as earnings and return
uncertainty,is that all the Xs are zero. Note that thealternative bypothesisincludes most other consumption theories such as the life cycle nxdel.
Before presenting the results of this regression it is useful to
describe values of the C( )seriesand changes through time in the shares of
personal income and its components received by different age groups. Table 1
presents actual consumption and consumption predicted by our ndel (C( ))
forselected years for alternative values of a and y. Consumption is measured
in 1912 dollars. The age—utility weights in this table are set such that Oa
equals .5 for age a less than 16 or age a greater than 85. At age 40 Oa is set
equal to 1. For ages between 15 and 140Oa riseslinearly from .5to1,andOa
declines linearly from 1 to .5betweenages 40 and 80. Quite similar results
arise for other choices of the values of 0 at ages 15 and 80.
From the preliminaryexamination of alternative parameters values
describedin Table 1, it appears that for certain sets of parameter values the
model presented in section III does fairly well in predicting actual consump-
tion.Of the parameter combinations examined in the table, a value of yequal
to 2, p equal to .04, and 0 equal to .5, produces the smallest root—mean squared
error for consumption. These parameter values are certainly within the middle
of the range of those that have been estimated.
Table 2 contains, for selected years, various income shares of
households whose heads are in particular age groups. The table also indicates
the fraction of allhouseholds with heads inparticular age intervals; and it
displaystheratio of the average income of households with heads in a
particularage category to the average income ofallhouseholds. Table 2
indicatessomesizeable changes in income shares of particular age groups—25-
between1968 and 19814. For example, the share of total income of households
with heads age 25 to 34 rose from18.6percent to 22.5 percent over the period.
For the 45—514 age group the income share fell during this period from 25.0
percent to 19.3 percent. Many of these changes are explained by changes in the
age distribution of households; the first column of the table is clearly highly
correlated with the second. But there were also changes in income shares over
the period that are not directly related to demographic change. The figures in
column3indicate that in 1968householdswith heads age 145 to 514had average
incomes that were L30 times the overall average household income. In 19814 such
households had average incomes that were 1.140 times the overall average. During
this 11 year period the ratio of the average income of households with 45to55
yearold heads to that of householdswith 25 to 34 yearold heads rose by 22
percent. Shares of property incomealsochanged significantly for certain age
groups; the 45to54year old group experienced a 35 percentdrop in its share
of property income between 1968 and 198)4. Similar sizeable changes in income shares
and income ratios are indicated in Table 2 for labor income and transfer income.
Table 3 reports maximum likelihood estimates of equation (15)
excluding income shares, including income shares of all age groups, and
including only the income share ofhouseholdsage 6andolder. Maximum
likelihoodestimates were derived by searching over a grid of values of y, p,
and 0. For each combination of these parameters, (15) was estimated by OLS.
The maximum likelihood estimates are those producing thesmallest residual sum
ofsquares. Following Arnemiya () standarderrors were computed by replacing
c.(
)in(15) witha first order Taylor's approximation taken aroundthe
maximum likelihoodestimates and estimating the resulting equation by OLS.—26—
Thecoefficientson the first deritives of )withrespect to y, p, and
first 0 are approximately equal to the maximum likelihood estimates, and the
standard errors of these and other righthand side estimated coefficients are
consistentand asymptotically efficient if ct is i.i.d., normal.
The first column of Table 3 confirms the point made above, that our
model tracks actual consumption fairiy well. The is .958, and the estimated
values of 'y'andp are both significant and reasonable. The coefficient on
is .172 and is significantly different from 1 at the 5 percent level. In
addition, the intercept is significantly different from zero. Both of these
results are at odds with the prediction of our ndel. Also at odds with our
model is the siificance of the 65+ income share in column (2) and the five
total income shares included in column three. The critical F(5,7) for the
inclusion of all the shares at the 5 percent level is 3.97, which is below the F
of 5.85 calculated for the inclusion of the five shares. The sign and to some
extent pattern of the income share coefficients accord with the prediction of
the life cycle model that redistribution from younger to older age groups raises
consunrption. According to these estimates a redistribution of 10 percent of
income from the youngest to the oldest age group would raise U.S. consumption by
.7 percent, evaluated at the mean value of consumption. With prevailing saving
rates, a .7 percent increase in consumption would lower the net national saving
rate by over 10 percent.
The significance of' age resource distribution variables does not apply
to the three components of income for which we have separate data, labor income,—27—
property income, and social security income. To reduce computation costs we
constrained y, p, and 0 in this analysis to equal their imxiiaim likelihood esti—
mates from column (1), Table 3. The F(5,l0) values for the inclusion of the
shares of labor income, propertyincome,and social security income are 1.87,
2.08, and 1.51, respectively. While these values are each below the critical F
of 3.33, if one constrains b1 to equal zero and b2 to equal 1, the respective
F(5,12) values are 12.2 for total income shares, 114.8 for labor income shares,
9.9 for property income shares, and 5.6 for social security income shares. The
critical F(5,l2) for this test is 3.11. Hence, the data reject the hypothesis
that age—resource shares are irrelevant given the mndel's predicted values of
b1 and b2.
To examine whether the significance of the age resource variables is
robust to choices of y, p, and 0 that differ from the n.xiinuni likelihood esti-
mates, we tested the significance of the total income shares for several different
constrainedchoices of these three rameters. The critical F value for these
tests isF(5,10)3.33.For l0, p.01, and 0.5 the Fstatisticis 16.75; for
y=l.1, p.014, and (3=.5theF statistic is 1.59; for y=2, p=.l5, and 0=.5 the F
statistic is 3.78,and for p.O5,y1.5, and e=.8theF statistic is14.75.
Hence,for a range of a priori choices ofy, p, and0,nst, but not all, of the
teststatistics for the inclusion of income shares are significant.
Table 14presentsmaximum likelihood estimates of (15)forthe period
1917 to 1977usinglevels of net Social Security wealth of different age groups.
For this 31 year sample period, the maximum likelihood estimates of y,p,and 0
areclose to those reported in Table 3. Whileb2is notsignificantly different—28—
from unity,as predicted by the theory, b1 is significantly different fromzero.
In addition, the Social Security wealth levels of different age groups are
significant explanatory variables. The F(6,20) statistic for their inclusion is
16.2, which exceeds the 5percentcritical value of 2.60.
VI. Conclusion
The results presented here clearly reject our formulation of the
altruism model. However, it should be restressed that the model imbeds strong
assumptions not only about preferences, but also about the extent and nature of
uncertainty.Rather than a rejection of altruism, the significance of the age
resource shares may reflect misspecification of the altruism model thatis
correlated with age resource shares. For example, the age resource shares might
conceivably enter in the processes determining earnings and rates of return.
In this case, the state variables, S, in c() shouldinclude the age resource
information, and the exclusion of this information would bias the results.
Alternatively, there may be a large numberof discreet altruistic families with
differentage structures. In this case, changes in the age distribution of
resourceswill typically be associated with changes in the interfamily
distribution of resources, and such changes would be expected to alter aggregate
consumption)-2
The paper's contribution is, hopefully, not only to test a particular
formulation of the Barro proposition, but to stimulate additional research that
directlytests central implications of lifecycle and altruistic saving models.—29—
Footnotes
1.These average annual net national saving rates are based on NIA data. The
198)4 saving rate is 5.2 peroent, a lower value than observed in anyyearin the
l950s. The saving rate over the past 15 years has averaged only slightly more
than three quarters of the average rate of the previous two decades.
2.Kotlikoff (198)4), Table 2.
3.Lawrence Weiss stressed this point and its implications for empirical tests
in a conversation with one of the authors several years ago.
14•This assumes the econon,r is below the golden nile.
5. Barro and Sahasakul (1983), Table 2, post 1980, column 2.
6.Boskin (1982,85) and Kotlikoff (198)4) provide extensive discussions of the
failure of officially recorded debt to measure underlying redistribution to
older generations.
7.One might argue that zero intergenerational transfers is an objective
benchmark. There are at least two problems with such a benchmark. First,
distinguishing negative intergenerational transfers fromtaxesrequired to
finance government consumption is completely arbitrary. Second, past
intergenerational transfers imply (require) offsetting current or future
intergeneration transfers. Hence, taking zero intergenerational transfers as
thebenchmark requires considering a world in which intergenerational transfers
in the past had always been zero.
8. 1982Economic Report of the President, Appendix to Chapter .
9.Estin.tionresults ofthisbivariate process are:
Dependent
Variable Constantlog Wt+T_1,a* rt+t_l B2
logv * .028 .989 .00111 .992 t+t,a (.0)42) (.015) (.0009)4)
r 17.11 .)435 —3.57 .302 t+t (6.66) (.1)49) (2.38)
/2 \f
The estimated covariance ntrix of CandCr is:( a (5.)403.lo
acr) 13.37
.05—30—
10. Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement.
11. Employment and Training Eeport of the President, 1982, Table BlO, p.23)-i and
Table A3, p.122; and Ibid, 1971, Table B15, p.257'.
12. There ma,rbefar fewer distinct altruistic Barro families than one might
think. Kotlikoff (1983) and Bernheim (1985) independently demonstrate that
maritalties can generate altruistic linkages across families, producing,
effectively, extremely large Barro families.—31—
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19)46—1984 69.7 58.3 75.6 78.6
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 3 Excess Sensitivity of Consumption to Income Shares,
l968—198,Maximum Likelihood Estimates (Standard Errors)
Models
(1) (2) (3)

















S3 66.1 5- (3.6)
S25 61.T —
(52.5)
R2 0.958 0.975 0.992
DW 1.12 .91 2.18
SSR 12083.6 7293.0 23314.6
SEE 28.14 22.8 15.3
Mean of Dependent Variable: 8145.5Table 14 Excess Sensitivity of Consumption to Social Security
WealthShares, 191471977, Maximum Likelihood Estimates (Standard Errors)
Models
(i) (2) (3)
y 2.0 1.5 1.5
(.'r83) (.221) (.092)
p .03 .05 .03
(.0114) (.009) (.010)
8 .5 .3 .3
(.157) (.204) (.083)
114.1 23.1 155.14 1 (16.7) (28.8) (141.9)

















B2 0.979 .986 0.996
DW .5 .9 1.6
SSR 18242.1 11796.2 3113.1
SEE 25.1 20.5 11.6
Mean of Dependent Variable: 540.8